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Are Your Credit Cards Safe From Me?
Cracking RSA Cryptography
James Clark
Introduction

codes and the war between the cryptographers and
cryptanalysts began.

We use cryptography every day. Governments
use it to send secret communications, banks use it
to send wire transfers, and we use it when we pay
for anything with a credit card. If we want to send
private information to anyone, cryptography is used
in order to keep that information secret. So it is
understandable that with such a high demand to
send private information that is secure, it is
important that the cryptosystem used cannot easily
be cracked. In order to understand how we have
reached this point, we shall look at the history of
cryptography and how it has evolved to the systems
we use today.

The Caesar cipher was secure for centuries,
until frequency analysis was created [10]. The idea
behind frequency analysis is that certain letters are
used more frequently than others and this fact can
be used to crack the Caesar cipher. Let us assume
that we are using the English language and have
intercepted a message encrypted with the Caesar
cipher. After examining a few texts in English, we
are able to establish the frequency that each letter is
used, such as in Figure 1. Since e is the most
common letter (as seen by Figure 1), if the
ciphertext’s most common letter is Qthen we can
assume that Q = e. This pattern can be followed for
the rest of the letters in the message until the key is
found

A Brief History and Evolution of Cryptography
The first cryptographic system widely used
was the Caesar shift cipher. It was first documented
as being used by Julius Caesar during the Gallic
Wars to send military messages [10]. The idea
behind this cipher is that the letters of the original
message, or plaintext (represented by lower case
letters), can be rewritten as different letters to
create the encrypted message, or ciphertext
(represented by upper case letters). An example of
this is shown in Table 1. If we want to send the
letter a, we would write D; to send b, we would
write E; to send c, we write F; and so on and so
forth. This example is the Caesar shift where the
alphabet has been shifted by three places. Other
examples of the Caesar shift can be seen in Table
2. The first one is an example where the ciphertext
is completely random and the second one begins
with the keyword or keyphrase Caesar Cipher
(CAESRIPH) and then the rest of the ciphertext is
alphabetical from the last letter of the keyphrase.
Between these three types of Caesar shift
algorithms, there are 26! permutations (or 403,
291, 461, 126, 605, 635, 584, 000, 000) of the
Caesar cipher. Simon Singh notes in his book The
Code Book that if we were able to check one key
per second, it would take a billion times the lifetime
of the universe to check every key in order to
decipher the message [10]. Thus there became a
need for cryptanalysts to break the cryptographer’s

The next famous cipher was created in the early
1500s by a former diplomat Blaise de Vigenère[10].
His idea was to improve the Caesar cipher by
encrypting the first letter with one Caesar cipher,
the next letter with another Caesar cipher, the third
letter with a third Caesar cipher, and so on and so
forth. He created what is known as the Vigenère
square (shown in Figure 2). A table and a keyword
(such as CODE) would be agreed upon beforehand.
To send a message, the first letter of the plaintext
would be encrypted using the C row, the second
letter with the O row, the third with the D row, and
24
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the forth with the E row. Once the end of the
keyword is reached the encryption would begin
with the beginning of the code word again (in this
case, with the letter C ). The advantages of the
Vigenère cipher is that with longer keywords it is
more difficult to crack and it is also impervious to
frequency analysis. Yet the cipher was eventually
cracked in the 1850’s by Edward Babbage because
he was still able to find patterns [10].

attack the valley at dawn or defend the hill at
sunset. This shows us that we can get conflicting
messages from the one-time pad cipher. In fact, we
can get any message that is 21 letters long (assuming
of course we are using a 21 letter keyphrase) which is
what makes the one-time pad cipher uncrackable.
With the two world wars, there was a
mechanization of cryptography with everything
from decoder rings to the Enigma machine. All of
these cryptosystems were eventually cracked except
for the one-time pad cipher [10]. Yet the problem
with the one-time pad cipher is that we have to
send the key unencrypted, so we would either have
to physically hand the key to the other person or
send an unencrypted message that enemies could
possibly intercept. Thus there was a need to be able
to send encrypted messages without having to either
communicate an encryption scheme with the other
person ahead of time or send unencrypted keys that
could potentially be intercepted.
Public Key Cryptography

It was not until 1918 when the head of of
cryptographic research for the U.S. Army, Major
Mauborgne, created an uncrackable cipher using the
Vigenère Cipher [10]. The idea behind the cipher is
that a pad of random letters would be used as the
keyphrase to encipher a message. Then once that
message was sent the pad would be thrown away and
a new pad would be used to encipher the next
message. This cryptosystem, called the “one-time
pad cipher”, has three advantages. The first one is
that frequency analysis cannot be used since it is a
type of Virgenère cipher. The second advantage is
the number of keys that would have to be tested is
extremely large. For instance, if one message had
21 letters for its keyphrase, then there are 2621 or

As we saw with the one-time pad cipher, the
problem is with the distribution of the key. If two
people, let us say they are Alice and Bob, want to
exchange messages, they must use a key which is a
secret. So the problem becomes transmitting the
secret key to the receiver in order to send the
encrypted message safely. In other words, before the
message is sent they must already have agreed upon a
key.
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman were
working on the problem of public key cryptography
and came up with a metaphor of what they wanted
to accomplish. Let us say that Alice and Bob want
to send a message to each other without Eve
intercepting their message. Alice puts her message
into a box, locks it with a padlock, and sends it to
Bob. Bob cannot open it when he receives it because
he does not have Alice’s key, so he puts his own
padlock on it and sends it back to Alice. Once
Alice receives it, she unlocks her padlock leaving
Bob’s padlock to keep the box locked. She sends it
back to Bob who can now unlock the box and read
Alice’s message. If Eve intercepts the box at any
point that it is in transit between Alice and Bob,
she will not be able to get into it [10].
There is a problem with this metaphor from a
mathematical perspective that needs to be solved in
order for the metaphor to work. The padlocks
represents an encryption that is a one-way function,

518, 131, 871, 275, 444, 637, 960, 845, 131, 776
permutations of the one-time pad key, which is more
than any human or computer could test in a
lifetime. The third advantage is best shown by an
example. Let us say that we have intercepted this
message from our enemies:
PEFOGJJRNUKCEIYVVUCXL. Assuming that it is
a the length of the keyphrase is 21, we can either
get the message attackthevalleyatdawn or
defendthehillatsunsetor iwanttobeagreendragon. Now we
can assume the person sending the message is not
talking about how he or she wants to be a green
dragon, but we do not know if our enemy is going to
25
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which means that it is easy to compute forward
and extremely difficult or impossible to go
backward (or the inverse of the function is
difficult/impossible to compute). So Alice first
encrypts the message, then Bob encrypts the message,
then Alice decrypts the message, then Bob decrypts
the message so he can read it. The problem is that
usually the last encryption needs to be the first one
taken off, otherwise the message would not be
readable [10]. The reason why the metaphor works
though is because the padlocks are independent of
each other. So they needed to find a one-way function
that would work the same way the padlocks do on the
box.
Diffie and Hellman solved the problem of key
distribution in 1976 and outlined the solution in
their paper “New Directions in Cryptography”.
This Diffie-Hellman encryption used the fact that

Bob obtains KAB in a similar way that Alice
calculates KAB ,

If Eve was able to intercept all of the
information sent between Alice and Bob (α, q,
YA , and YB ), in order to know KAB she would
have to calculate

is a one-way function for which it is extremely
difficult to find its inverse. For instance, given any
X we are able to calculate Y . Calculating X from
Y where

Diffie and Hellman point out that if logarithms
mod q could be easily computed then the
cryptosystem would not work. While they do not
have a proof of the this fact (or its converse), they
could not find a way to compute KAB from YA
and YB unless they either have XA or XB . Thus
they have found a new public key distribution
where only one key needs to be exchanged and its
use can be coupled with a directory of user
information to authenticate Alice to Bob and Bob
to Alice [4]. The only disadvantage is that we still
had to communicate the key to the person that we
want to send the messages.
It was not until 1977 that Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman created a public key
cryptography in which the receiver and sender did
not have to communicate outside of the encrypted
messages. We can understand their process with
another metaphor where Alice wants to send Bob a
message. Again, she is going to put the message in
a box, but instead of putting her padlock on the
box she is going to put on a combination lock
where Bob knows the combination. So she goes to
the store and buys the “Bob Combination
lock,” locks the box and sends the box
to Bob. So when Bob receives the box,
he can unlock it and read the message. Yet if
Eve intercepts the box, she cannot get into it because
she does not know the combination. So the lock
itself would be the public key, the combination

is much more difficult due to the difficulty of
computing logarithms mod q, which is why the
technique is so secure [4].
So let us assume that Alice and Bob want to
send a message to each other. Each of them must
generate a random number from the set {1, 2, . . . , q
− 1} (XA for Alice and XB for Bob). Each of
them are going to keep their respective numbers, X ,
a secret. Alice and Bob will communicate with
each other and agree on an α and q. Next Alice will
compute Equation 1 and Bob will compute Equation
2 and publish these results.

In order for Alice and Bob to communicate
secretly, they calculate

and use that as their key.
Alice obtains KAB by using Bob’s published
number, YB and calculates
26
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Alice can decode the message by computing
the e-th roots of the digits received (and they are
unique since e is relatively prime to φ(n)) [3]. Alice
can do this by calculating d, where ed ≡ 1 (mod
φ(n)), by using Euclid’s algorithm on e and φ(n)
since raising to the d-th power is the same as taking
the e-th roots. In fact, Alice can compute d as soon
as e has been chosen and does not have to remember p
and q. Consequently, if Eve intercepts the message,
she can decrypt the message only if she can factor n
into its two primes since she can repeat Alice’s
process to calculate d. Therefore the message is secure
if n cannot be easily factored.[3][6]
This method does allow Alice and Bob to send
messages without communicating the key to each
other, which Diffie and Hellman could not offer
with their encryption scheme. Yet what is
stopping Eve from sending a message to Bob
pretending to be Alice? To solve this problem
Alice needs to know Bob’s public key (nB , eB )
and her private key (nA , dA ). If nA < nB ,
Alice would send Equation 3 in order to send her
signature M . Bob can verify that the message is
from Alice by calculating Equation 4 where C is
the ciphertext, dB is part of Bob’s decipher key, and
eA is part of Alice’s encipher key. If nA > nB ,
Alice would then send Equation 5 and Bob will
compute Equation 6. [6]

would be the private key, the lock is the one-way
function, and Alice and Bob never have to
communicate outside the encryption. So how does
RSA work?
Let us say that Alice wants to let other people,
such as Bob, send her secure, encrypted messages that
no one except Alice would be able to decrypt. She
first selects two distinct primes, p and q, that are
sufficiently large and random (e.g. not Mersenne
primes) [3], where the two primes should not be
close together, and both p − 1 and q − 1 have at
least one large prime factor [6]. She then will
multiply the primes together and call that number n
(so n = pq). Alice then chooses a number e that is
relatively prime to φ(n) where φ(n) is the Euler φ
function and denotes the number of positive integers
less than or equal to n that are also relatively prime
to n (so φ(n) = φ(p)φ(q) = (p − 1)(q − 1)) [1]. φ(n)
and e are relatively prime if the greatest common
divisor between φ(n) and e is 1 (i.e. g.c.d.(φ(n), e)
= 1) [1]. Once n is calculated and e is chosen, Alice
has her public key and publishes these numbers in a
directory. [3][6]
When Bob wants to send Alice a message, he
wants to choose a ciphertext message that varies from
user to user. So Bob wants to choose a plaintext to
ciphertext algorithm that is uniform throughout the
system. In order to do this he must first figure out
what N -letter alphabet he wants to use (e.g. if he
wants to use all of the letters, numbers, and symbols
on the keyboard, then N would be 96.). He then
chooses a k∈ N such that N k−1 < n < N k (N k
should also be fairly large, Koblitz writes that it
should be greater than 200 decimal digits [6]). Bob
then takes the plaintext and splits it up into blocks
of k − 1 letters, or (k − 1)-digit base-N integers.
This means that Bob assigns numerical equivalents
between 0 and N k−1 for each k – 1 block. We

Therefore the only way that Eve could read
Alice’s messages or even send messages as Alice is if
she can factor nA . So how hard can it be to factor
nA into its two prime factors?

similarly take ciphertext into units to be blocks of
k letters in the N -alphabet. Therefore any
plaintext message unit will be integers less than N
k−1 and correspond to an element in Z/nZ for any

Methods of Factorization to Crack RSA
Cryptography
If we want to crack RSA cryptography we
must be able to figure out the prime factorization
of n. It is important to note that there are ways to
manipulate the particular execution of RSA in
certain cases that would allow Eve to learn the secret
plaintext intended for Alice by using a chosenciphertext attack [7], but this is outside the scope of
the project and we will be concentrating on methods
of factorization to crack RSA cryptography. Thus,
the most intuitive way to approach the problem is

n. Since n < N k , the image f (P ) c Z/nZ can be
uniquely written as a k-letter block. It is
important to note that only the corresponding kletter block integers that occur are integers less than
n, so not all of the k-block integers will be used.
We transform the k − 1 block to a k block by
taking each plaintext k − 1 block, P , and calculate
C = P e (mod n) where C is the ciphertext block.
This number C can then be written as a k block
ciphertext. [6]
27
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to create a list of primes less than √ (e.g. Sieve of
Eratosthenes or using primality testing on each
number less than √ ) and start dividing n by these
primes to see if we get another prime q. Yet if n
is sufficiently large it may take an extremely long
time to arrive at n’s factorization. As a result, we
will be looking at different factorization methods
in order to find the prime factors of n.

Figure 3: Where the Rho Method gets its name
Yet when j becomes substantially large, it is
time consuming to compute g.c.d.(xj − xi , n) for
each i < j.We can minimize our work by computing
one g.c.d. for each j. When we have found a i0 and a
j0 such that xi0 ≡ xj0 (mod r) for some r that is a
divisor of n (i.e. r|n), we have the relation xi ≡ xj
(mod r) for any pair of indices i, j such that j − i =
j0 − i0. So when xi ≡ xj (mod r), then xi+1 = f (xi )
≡ f (xj ) = xj+1 (mod r) and the sequence xi
becomes periodic mod r with period j − i. One
method then to reduce the number of g.c.d.s that
have to be calculated is after we compute xj we
suppose that j is an (h + 1)-bit integer, which
means that 2h ≤ j < 2h+1 . Let i be the largest h-

Pollard’s Rho Method of Factorization
The first method of factorization that we will
be looking at is Pollard’s rho method of
factorization, which is the simplest factorization
algorithm and substantially faster than the trial
division of primes less than √ [6]. First, we
choose an easily evaluated map f : Z/nZ →
Z/nZ, which means we choose a fairly simple
polynomial mod n with integer coefficients. It is
best that this function maps to itself in a disjointed
manner (and should therefore not be linear and 1to-1)[6], some examples of a function that we
would use are f (x) = x2 + 1 (mod n) or f (x) =

bit integer, which means i = 2h − 1. We compute
g.c.d.(xj − xi , n) for these particular i, j. If the
g.c.d. gives a nontrivial divisor of n then we have
our answer, if not we make the same calculations
for j + 1. Another method of calculating g.c.d.s is
to let b equal the period of the sequence (i.e. b = j
− i), then xk ≡ xl (mod r) whenever k ≡ l (mod
b), k ≥ i, and l ≥ i. Therefore, if we let k be the
least multiple of b where k ≥ i and let l = 2k,
then xk ≡ xl (mod r). As a result, we can
calculate g.c.d.(x2i − xi , n) to find a nontrivial
factor of n. [6][8]
The advantage of these two methods of
calculating the g.c.d. is that we need to only
compute one for each j, but the drawback to this is
that it probably will not detect the first time there is
a j0 where g.c.d.(xj0 −xi0 , n) is a nontrivial factor of
n for some i0 < j0. Nevertheless, we will find a xj
and xk whose difference has a common factor with
n in less time. Also, the method may be expected to
disclose the smallest prime factor p of n in roughly
cycles, and is therefore faster than trial division
for large n. It is important to note that the divisor
obtained by this method may either be a prime
factor, a composite number, or even n itself. In this
situation when it is not a prime factor we would
have to start over with a new x0, a new function f, a
new way to compute the g.c.d., or any combination
of these three inputs. [6][8]

2x2 + x + 5 (mod n). Next, we choose a
particular starting values x = x0 , where x0 can
either be selected or randomly generated, and
compute consecutive iterations of f (meaning that
xi+1 = f (xi ), for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · ). Finally, we
compare the different xi ’s in order to find two
with different residue classes modulo n that are the
same residue class modulo a divisor of n. When such
an xi and xj are found, we compute the g.c.d.(xj −
xi , n) to find a prime factor n (meaning not 1 or n)
and can then find the second prime factor by
dividing n by the first prime factor. Since we are
finding a point in the sequence where xi ≡ xj we
see that this pattern, which can be seen in Figure 3,
resembles a Greek letter ρ and is where the method
obtained its name. [6][8]

28
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generalized even further and leads to a more
efficient factoring method. [6]

Fermat’s Method of Factorization, Part I
The second method of factorization that we will
look at relies on the theorem that every odd number
in Z can be represented by the difference of two
squares (∀ acZ, (a + 1)2 − a2 = a2 + 2a + 1 − a2 =
2a + 1). Thus we can represent the n from the public
key in RSA cryptography as

Fermat’s Method of Factorization, Part II
⁄
An element
is a quadratic residue modulo
⁄
n if there exists an
such that
=
(
), and means that x is a square root of z.
Also, if =
were p and q are distinct primes,
then every quadratic residue modulo n has exactly
four square roots. Therefore, if we are given any
≡
(
) where ≢ (
), we can
compute a non-trivial factor since Equation 11
implies Equation 12.

(7)
(8)

≡
(mod n)
− ≡ 0 (mod n)
( + )( − ) ≡ 0

2

If c a perfect square, then we have found b and c
and have therefore found p and q (since p and q
defined in terms of b and c). If c2 is not a perfect
square, we evaluate b = [ ( )] + 2 and compute
Equation 8 again to see if the new c2 is a perfect
square. We continue this iterated process until c2 is
a perfect square and therefore found our factors. [6]
If p and q are close together, then =
is

+ 1.

(9)

We then evaluate
−

=

(12)

We can then fin d a factor of n by computing
. . . ( + , ) or . . . ( − , ) since
| − and ∤ ( + ) or ∤ ( − ) because
≢± (
). Therefore, . . . ( + , ) =
is a proper factor of n and
is divisible by
. . . ( − , ). [5][6]
Thus, this quadratic sieve algorithm needs to
find values for b and c such that their squares are
equal modulo n. Yet if n is sufficiently large, a
random selection of b where the least positive
(
) is a perfect square is
residue of
improbable and is necessary to generalize the
method to allow flexibility in our choice of b’s to
evaluate. Thus we want to choose several b’s with
) is a product of small
the condition (
prime powers so that a subset of them will give a b
whose square is congruent to a perfect square
modulo n when multiplied together. [5][6]
So let B be a factor base, which is set
= { , , … , } of distinct primes (except
may be -1). We then must find integers b such that,
for any given n that we are factoring,
(
)
is the least absolute residue and can be written as a
product of numbers from B ( found by trial
division and primarily testing). We will call these
numbers B-numbers. Also, should be greater
) = ∏ℎ
than √ to ensure that (
and
the jth component of =
(
2), so

small and b is slightly larger than √ . Therefore
we will be able to find the factorization of the n
after a few iterations of this process. So what
happens if p and q are not close together? The
Fermat method will eventually find p and q, but
only after trying a large number of iterations of b,
but there is a way to minimize the number of
calculations and find our factorization. First, let
Ν be small and
= √

(11)

(10)

and see if is a perfect square. We used the same
process as before to find a b where Equation 10 is
a perfect square. Once such a b is found, we know
that ( + ) = ( − ) =
and therefore know
that + and n have a nontrivial common factor.
We can then find this factor by computing
. . . ( + , ) to get one of our prime factors.
This generalized Fermat method works quicker
than the method outlined with Equations 7 and 8
when q is close to kp, and therefore reduces the
number of b’s that need to be tried to find the
factorization of n. This method can then be

=

0
1

29
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So consider when we have some set of Bnumbers such that the corresponding vectors →

(mod n). It is important to note that given the
collection of vectors in , we can be sure to find a
subset of them that sum to zero because we are
looking for a collection of vectors that are linearly
dependent over the field. We know from linear
algebra that (→, . . . , ,) is linearly dependent in

= {βi1, . . . , βih}add up to the zero vector in .
This means that the product of least absolute
residues of equals the product of even powers of
all of the pj in B. So if for each i we let ai be the
least absolute residue of
(mod n) and write
ai= ∏
we get

, if we have h + 1 vectors that are h-tuples. So
we will have to generate at most h + 1 distinct Bnumbers to find when

If h is sufficiently large, it helps to write the
vectors as rows in a matrix and use row-reduction
techniques to find linearly dependent set of rows
that sum to zero. [5][6]
We can now outline a systematic method of
factoring n using Fermat’s method and factor
bases. First, choose an integer y of intermediate
size (Koblitz gives the example of an intermediate
size - if n is fifty digits, let y be five or six digits
[6]). Let B be all of the primes less than or equal to
y and −1. Next, choose a large number of random
bi and try to express
(mod n) as least absolute
residues that are products of the primes in B.
Once we have obtained (π(y) + 2) B-numbers
(where π(y) is the number of primes that do not
exceed y [1]) we generate the corresponding
(where h = π(y) + 1) in order
vectors, , →,), in

Since the exponent of each pj in Equation 13 is an
even number, we can rewrite the product as a
square and get Equation 14. Hence, when we set

where both b and c are least positive residues, we
get two numbers whose squares are congruent
modulo n. [5][6]
Of course, this fails if b ≡ ±c (mod n) and we
must start over again with another collection of Bnumbers whose corresponding vectors sum to zero
(this will happen if we choose B-numbers less
than

since all of the vectors are zero-vectors and

we get a trivial congruence). Yet if we choose bi
randomly we can expect that b ≡ c (mod n) (up to
±1) at most 50% of the time. The reason for this is
because any square modulo n has 2r square roots if
n has r distinct prime factors. Therefore a random
square root of b2 has chance of being ±b (which
is less than 50% since r ≥ 2). So when we have b2
≡ c2 (mod n) where b ≢ ± c (mod n)
we can find a nontrivial factor of n by computing
g.c.d.(b + c, n). Koblitz points out that if we go
through this procedure of finding b and c until we
find a pair that gives us a nontrivial factor of n,
there is at most a 2−k probability that it will take
more than k tries. [6]
We can choose our factor base B and our Bnumbers bi with a few different methods. One
method is to start with B consisting of the first h −
1 primes, let p1 = −1, and choose random bi’s until
several are found that are B-numbers. Another
method is to start choosing some bi where
(mod
n) is a least absolute residue and is small in
absolute value (one way to do this is to choose bi
close to √ where k is small).Then, choose B to
consist of a small set of small primes (with p1 =
−1) so that several bi’s are B-numbers when

to get linear dependence. We then put the vectors
into a matrix and use row-reduction to determine
the subset of bi’s whose corresponding → add up
to zero. We then let b= ∏

(

) and =

∏ ( ) ∑
(
) so that b2 ≡ c2 (mod n)
(which gives us Equation 15) . If b ≢ ±c (mod n),
compute g.c.d.(b + c, n) to get a nontrivial factor of
n. If b ≡ ±c (mod n), choose a different subset of
rows in the matrix of →’s that sum to zero, adding
a few more B-numbers and their corresponding
rows if necessary. If this does not work then we
start the process over again with new random
collection of B-numbers. [6]
Continued Fraction Method
The continued fraction method of factorization is a
refinement of Fermat’s method of factorization
with factor bases. In the previous section we
needed to find a reliable method of finding integers
b where 1 ≤ b ≤ n such that the least absolute
residue b2 (mod n) is a product of small primes,
30
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which is likely to happen when |b2 (mod n)| is
small. This method uses continued fractions, hence
the name, to find b’s such that |b2 (mod n)| <2√ .
So we need to understand a few things about
continued fractions before we can understand this
factorization method.
A continued fraction is defined as follows:
Given a real number x, we construct its continued
fraction by first letting

This will work for all k provided that when k = 1
we interpret the second bracket as 1 ([q0, q1] =
q0[q1] + 1 = q0q1 + 1, which is what it is supposed
to be). [3]
So we see that [q0, q1, . . . , qk ] is the sum of
certain products formed from the set {q0, q1, . . . ,
qk }, but how do we form the products? The
answer was found by Euler, who was the first to
give a general account of continued fractions, and
created “Euler’s rule” to form the products. The
rule instructs us to first take the product of all the
terms, then take every product that can be acquired
by omitting any pair of consecutive terms, then
take every product that can be acquired by
omitting any two separate pairs of consecutive
terms, and so on and so forth. The summation of
these products is equal to the value of [q0, q1, . . . ,
qk ]. If n is odd (giving us n + 1 terms, which is
even) we add the empty product or the product of
all the terms omitted, which we have defined as 1.
This can be proved by induction using the
recurrence relation in Equation 22. We assume the
rule holds for the right hand side of Equation 22
and we have to prove that it holds for the left hand
side. [q2, q3, . . . , qk ] is the sum of all the products
formed from the set {q0, q1, . . . , qn} where q0 and
q1 have been omitted. Therefore q0[q1, q2, . . . , qk
] is the sum of all the products formed from the set
{q0, q1, . . . , qn} where q0 and q1 is not omitted
since all the products must contain q0. When that
factor is removed we are left with the sum of
products from the set {q1, . . . , qn} where any
separate pairs of consecutive terms are omitted.
Thus, we get the appropriate sum of products and
the rule holds for the function [q0, q1, . . . , qk ] for
all k. [3]
Davenport points out that an immediate
deduction of Euler’s rule is that the value of [q0, q1,
. . . , qk ] is the same if the terms are rewritten the
reverse order, meaning [q0, q1, . . . , qk ] = [qk , qk−1,
. . . , q0]. This is true because we can express [q0,
q1, . . . , qk ] in terms of a similar function as
Equation 22, except with the last term or last two
terms omitted:

is an integer (and therefore xk = 0). The process
will terminate when x is rational because all xk ’s
will be rational with decreasing denominators.
Therefore, the continued fraction looks like

where Equation 17 is the compact notation of
Equation 16 and each continued fraction is unique
by the way we have defined it [3][6]. So the
general form of a continued fraction is

and we can let q0, q1, . . . , qk be variables in order
to manipulate the continued fraction into the
expression of a quotient of two sums where each
sum is composed of various products from the set
{q0, q1, . . . , qk }. We see that if k = 1, 2, 3 we can
manipulate the continued fraction as

where the value of q1 + in Equation 20 is derived
from Equation 19 and evaluating q1 and q2 in
place of q0and q1 respectively. Equation 21 was
derived in the same way using Equation 20. Thus,
we can build out the general continued fraction in
this manner and can represent the numerator of
Equation 18 as [q0, q1, . . . , qk ]. When we look at
Equations 19, 20, and 21 we see that the
denominator of the expression can be represented
as [q1, q2, . . . , qk ] since the denominator is
derived from the numerator of the previous answer.
Therefore, we can represent the general continued
fraction as

This is equivalent to Equation 22 because we can
rewrite the terms in the opposite order to get [qk ,
qk−1, . . . , q0] = qk [qk−1, . . . , q0] + [qk−2, . . . , q0]
which is a restatement of Equation 22 with
different symbols. [3] We can now define the i-th
convergent of the continued fraction as the
continued fraction terminated at qi where i < k of
31
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the general continued fraction (Equation 18). The
value of the i-th convergent is

will be closer to than the previous convergent.
[3]
In order to see the continued fraction method
of factoring, we need to use these facts to prove
that |b2 (mod n)| < 2√ . First, if x > 1 is a real
number whose continued fraction expansion has
convergents , then | −
| < 2x. Since x is

where Ai = [q0, q1, . . . , qi] and Bi = [q1, q2, . . . , qi]
to simplify notation. We see from this definition
that the first convergent is = , the last
convergent

between

is the continued fraction itself, and

and

and the absolute value of the

difference between the successive convergents is
(from Equation 28) we can see that

Ai and Bi for 0 ≤ i ≤ k are natural numbers defined
by the sums and products of qi’s as we have
defined above. The recurrence relation from
Equation 23 can now be represented as

where Bi has q0 omitted. [3] From these two
equations, we can show that any two consecutive
convergents will differ by a factor of (−1)i−1, or

So if n is a positive integer which is not a
perfect square, we can let be the convergents in
the continued fraction expansion of √ so that the
residue of
(mod n) is the smallest in absolute
value (between − and ) is less than √ . When

Therefore, the expression on the left of Equation
26, which we will call δi, has the property that δi =
− δi −1 which can then be recursively defined to
give us δi = − δi −1 = +δi−2 = · · · = ± δi where ±
δi is +1 if i is odd and −1 if i is even. Therefore, it
can be represented by (−1)i−1 due to the fact that
δ1 = 1 and Equation 27 is true. [3] A consequence
of Equation 26 is that Ai and Bi will always be
relatively prime and therefore the fraction Bi is in
lowest terms, which means that all convergents
(including the continued fraction itself ) is in
lowest terms. So when we represent a rational
number as a continued fraction, the convergents
of the continued fraction compose a sequence of
rational numbers with the last one being We can
see that the convergents will alternately be less
than and greater than the final value of by
rewriting Equation 26 as

we apply the previous theorem with x =√ we see
that ≡ − n
(mod n)and the latter integer is
less than √ in absolute value. This is the key to
the continued fraction method of factorization
because we can find a sequence of bi’s that have
small residues when squared by taking the
numerators of the convergents of the continued
fraction expansion of √ . We do not even have to
find the actual convergent since we are only using
the numerator bi (mod n) and the fact that the
numerator and denominator of the convergents
become large is not a problem since we are
working with integers less than or equal to n2
when we are multiplying integers modulo n. [6]
So here is the algorithm for the continued
fraction method of factoring. Let n be the integer
that we want to find its factorization. We first set
b−1 = 1, b0 = a0 = = √ and
= √ − and
compute (mod n) [or
− n]. Next, for i = 1, 2,
. . . we first set ai =
(mod n), then set bi =

Furthermore, since Bi < Bj for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ k the
difference in Equation 28 will decrease as i
increases. We can also see that the even
convergents will be less than the odd convergents

aibi−1 + bi−2 (mod n) and compute
(mod n).
After this is done for several i, we look at the bi
(mod n) which factor into ± a product of small
primes. We then create a factor base B that are

will be greater than , and that each convergent
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composed of −1and the primes that occur more
than once of the set
(mod n) or occur with an
even power in just oneb2
2i (mod n). We then
list all of the numbers
(mod n) which are Bnumbers, along with their correspondingβi of
zeros and ones and find a subset whose vectors
sum to zero. We then set b = ∏ (mod n) and c

new starting value x0, a new way to compute the
g.c.d., or any combination of these three inputs.
The third problem is that there are too many
choices for inputs. It is not something that can
immediately be executed [like Fermat’s method
(Part I)] and the choices that are made do not
guarantee success, thus causing our choices to be
re-evaluated for the second round of calculations
if we do not get a proper factor.
Fermat’s method (Part I), on the other hand,
is a little more complex than the rho method in its
computations, yet it is immediately executable and
will give us the answer the first time (even if it
takes a while). The disadvantage to Fermat’s
method is that when it is being executed by a
computer program there is a chance that there is a
problem with overflow errors (e.g. t2 or n exceed
the upper bounds of the computer’s computational
limits).
In order to examine each method further I
wrote C programs for both methods. For each
method I tested 24 numbers that were 19 digits in
length (the highest my computer could test) where
the primes were randomly generated and had
varying distances between each other. The results
for each of these numbers can be seen in Table 4
on page 15, but my findings can be summarized in
Table 3 where I look at the average time each
method took to calculate the prime factors as well
as if the method is successful on this first try.
There are two things that are important to note
about the results. The first is that for the rho
method I used f (x) = x2 + x + 1, x0 = 2, and I used
the first method to calculate the g.c.d. that was
outlined in the rho method section on page 6. The
second thing is that for Fermat’s method (Part I), I
was only able to write a program using Equations 7
and 8 and not Equations 9 and 10 since I was using
values of n close to the upper bound of my
computer’s limits and calculating kn in Equation 9
would have caused overflow errors. As Table 3
shows, the rho method took an average time of 26
minutes to compute an answer and 33% of the time
it was able to find the correct prime factorization
of n. This means that 66% of the time it did not
give me an answer, but it could with different
initial conditions. Conversely, Fermat’s method
took an average time of less than a tenth of a
second and was always able to find the
factorization of n. Therefore, when comparing
these two methods of factorization, I have found
that Fermat’s method of factorization is faster and
more reliable.

∑

= ∏
where pj are the elements of B\{−1}
and the sum is taken over the same subset of i. If
B≢ ± c (mod n), then g.c.d.(b + c, n) is a
nontrivial factor of n. If b ≡ ± c (mod n), then we
evaluate a different subset of i such that ∑ ⃗= 0. If
this is not possible, then more ai, bi, and
(mod
n) must be computed to expand our factor base B.
[6]
Which Method Is The Best?: The Advantages
and Disadvantages of Each Method
While there are other methods of factoring
that could be used (e.g. elliptic curve factorization,
index calculus method, etc.) in order to crack RSA
cryptography, these three methods are the simplest
factoring methods that I could find. So now that
we have these three methods, which one is the
best for cracking RSA cryptography?
Pollard’s Rho Method vs. Fermat’s Method
(Part I)
Pollard’s rho method of factorization is the
simplest factorization algorithm of the ones
discussed in this paper. Simple calculations such
as evaluating a chosen function, doing modular
arithmetic, and finding the greatest common
divisor of two numbers are all simple to do by
hand or to code into a computer program (and all
of these calculations are computationally
inexpensive to calculate), yet there are some
disadvantages to this method. The first one is that
there are many computations that need to be done
to find the factorization. This increase in the
number of computations can lead to errors (when
calculating by hand as well as coding a computer
program) and increase the time it takes to find the
answer. Even if the functions are computationally
inexpensive to calculate in a computer program,
the number of calculations that have to be done
will add up and therefore take longer to find the
prime factors. Second, we may not find the factor
on the first attempt which means that we would
have to start over with either a new function f , a
33
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cryptography. So is RSA cryptography secure?
Yes. But how can that be? The first reason why
this is true is the size of the public key. When I
was factoring numbers with the computer
programs I wrote, the largest number my computer
could handle was 9, 000, 000, 114, 000, 000, 361
which is 19 digits long and less than 64 bits. RSA
keys are typically 1024-2048 bits long [9],
meaning that the public key n is 21024 − 1 ≤ n ≤
22048 − 1. That means the public key is somewhere
between 309-617 digits long which is outside the
bounds of any personal computer and cannot be
factored with any C programs of the factorization
methods above. The second reason RSA
cryptography is secure is that even if we had a
computer that could factor these numbers, it
would take an extremely long time. The primes
chosen to create n follow a set of conditions (see
page 5) such that factorization is made extremely
difficult and maximizes the amount of time to find
its factorization. Also, the people who use RSA
cryptogrpahy switch their keys on a regular basis.
So by the time we have found the factorization of
their public key, they have started using a new key
and our work has been for nothing (except the
satisfaction that we now know the factorization of
a very large number, but that is not worth much).
Therefore, RSA cryptography is secure not
because it is uncrackable, but the amount of time
and effort that must go into to cracking it is not
realistic or feasible.

Fermat’s Method (Part I) vs. Continued
Fraction Method and Fermat’s Method (Part
II)
Since the continued fraction method of
factorization is a refinement of Fermat’s
factorization with factor bases, there is no point in
comparing these two methods. Instead, we shall
compare Fermat’s method (Part I) and the
continued fraction method. We can see from the
descriptions of the Fermat’s method (Part II) and
continued fraction method that the process is more
intricate and complex than Fermat’s method (Part
I), yet the mathematics involved is still elementary.
While I was able to write a C program for Fermat’s
method (Part I), I was not able to for Fermat’s
method (Part II) or the continued fraction method
due to the complexity of the process and my
introductory knowledge of C programming. Thus I
was not able to compare the two methods as I did
with Pollard’s rho method and Fermat’s method
(Part I). Assuming that I had the knowledge to
write such a program, the calculations involved can
be programmed on a computer with singleprecision floating point and it lends itself to
parallel processing. The computers can even be
linked by e-mail to complete the task. The
disadvantage is that it is very memory-intensive so
that you need a good deal of computing power,
while Fermat’s method (Part I) can be done on a
calculator. Also, the continued fraction method
works best for numbers that are roughly 300 bits
long. The reason for this is that the continued
fraction method requires that we find primes less
than the number we are factoring, and primality
testing and trial division of large numbers becomes
increasingly difficult. Therefore, for numbers that
are roughly 300 bits long the continued fraction
method works as well as Fermat’s method (Part I)
but can find the results quicker. For numbers
greater than 300 bits long, it can still find the
answer but Fermat’s method (Part I) will probably
be quicker. [2][5][8]
Conclusion of Cracking RSA Cryptography
We have looked at three different methods of
factorization in this paper, and while they all have
their advantages and disadvantages, they are all
capable of factoring the public key in RSA
34
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